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Abstract 
Two experiments are reported in which people resolve references to sets of entities (e.g. 
lies) that have previously been introduced either explicitly into a text (“the lies”) or implicitly 
via a cognate verb (a form of the verb “to lie”). Pronominal references to such entities were 
judged as relatively unacceptable, and required longer judgement times when judgements 
were positive, compared to cases in which the antecedent was explicit. This finding suggests 
that the inference from the activity of lying to a set of lies is made in the backwards 
direction (Garnham & Oakhill, Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 40A, 719-735) . 
Results with full noun phrase anaphors show a different pattern, with no penalty in either 
times or acceptability judgements for the implicit case. The results are discussed in terms of 
Sanford and Garrod’s (1981, Understanding written language) hypotheses about reference 
processing and the notion of the centrality of an antecedent in a scenario. 
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Looking back to “Anaphoric Islands” 
In an influential paper, Postal (1969) noted that, although the interpretation of 
“them” in (1) should clearly be Max’s parents, (1) is not an allowable way of expressing this 
intended message in English. 
(1) Max is an orphan and he deeply misses them. 
Using an analogy from the work of Haj Ross (1967) on what were then regarded as 
movement rules in syntax, Postal argued that lexical items, “orphan” in this case, are 
anaphoric islands to what he called outbound anaphora, where the lexical item is supposed 
to contain the antecedent for an anaphor outside of it. Postal considered the anaphoric 
island phenomenon to be all-or-none, and argued that the constraint was a syntactic one. 
Garnham and Oakhill (1988) showed that attempts to refer into anaphoric islands 
both slowed people down and reduced judgements of acceptability, compared to the case 
where the antecedent was explicit. However, a substantial number of positive acceptability 
judgements were still recorded in the anaphoric islands versions. Furthermore, pronominal 
references into anaphoric islands are relatively common in everyday language (e.g. Oakhill & 
Garnham, 1992; Ward et al., 1991). In Garnham and Oakhill’s (1988) materials, unlike in (1), 
there was a morphological relation between the lexical item that was the anaphoric island 
and the obvious way of presenting the antecedent explicitly, as in (2).  
(2) Little Billy always lies to his mother, but they are never convincing. 
Following the publication of Postal’s paper, a number of linguists (e.g. Tic 
Douloureux, 1971; Lakoff & Ross, 1972; Corum, 1973; Watt 1975) suggested that the 
anaphoric island phenomenon was graded, rather than all-or-none, and that morphological 
relatedness was one of the factors that made anaphoric reference into an anaphoric island 
more acceptable. Later, Gregory Ward (Ward, Sproat, & McKoon, 1991; Ward 1997) 
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proposed that the constraints on reference into anaphoric islands are pragmatic in nature, 
rather than syntactic. From a psycholinguistic point of view, this idea suggests that attempts 
to refer into anaphoric islands should be understood in the context of general theories of 
anaphoric reference and inference. 
One such theory is the one developed by Tony Sanford and colleagues (and in 
particular Simon Garrod, see Sanford & Garrod, 1981 for an early, detailed exposition). A 
crucial component of this theory is the distinction between explicit and implicit focus. 
Explicit focus contains representations of things recently mentioned in a text, and is the 
natural domain in which pronouns find their reference. Implicit focus provides a so-called 
extended domain of reference, including items whose existence is implied in a text, but not 
explicitly stated. References to items in implicit focus typically require full noun phrase 
anaphors. Sanford and Garrod’s presentation of their ideas reflects the shift in thinking from 
linguistic expressions as the antecedents for anaphors to representations of objects 
introduced by linguistic expressions (discourse referents) as antecedents. 
A somewhat separate question is: how easy, or difficult, is it for anaphoric elements 
to pick up referents from their appropriate domain of reference, and, indeed, how hard is it 
for them to pick up referents from an inappropriate domain? A related issue is what factors 
affect the search for referents, and whether they are the same in the two domains of 
reference. The results of the classic study of full NP anaphora by Haviland and Clark (1974) 
are readily reinterpretable in the Sanford and Garrod framework. In (3) the antecedent for 
“the beer” is not explicit, but beer is a reasonably probable component of picnic supplies (in 
1970s California!) and so can be thought of as existing in the extended domain of reference. 
(3) We checked the picnic supplies. The beer was warm. 
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The second sentence of (3) is readily interpreted, but reading is slowed down compared 
with the case in which beer is explicitly mentioned as in (4). 
(4) We got some beer out of the trunk. The beer was warm. 
Later work has shown that the reading of full NP anaphors is not always slowed 
down when the antecedent is implicit, and hence in the extended domain of reference (e.g., 
Garrod & Sanford, 1981; Walker & Yekovitch, 1987). Indeed, there are cases where the 
interpretation of pronouns that refer to objects (apparently) in the extended domain of 
reference is not slowed either (Ward et al., 1991; Cornish et al., 2005). The qualification 
“apparently” is added, because it may be that implicit focus contains representation of a 
small number of items that are not explicitly mentioned in the text. The exact 
characterisation of these cases is not yet clear, but it appears to involve some notion of 
centrality of the implied object in the scenario presented in the text. 
Postal (1969 restricted his discussion of NP-anaphora and anaphoric islands to 
pronouns rather than full noun phrase anaphors. On one reading of Postal, it might be 
expected that full NP anaphors that attempt to refer into anaphoric islands would also be 
problematic. However, (5) is not unacceptable in the way that (1) is. 
(5) Max is an orphan and he deeply misses his parents. 
One explanation would be that Max’s parents are in the extended domain of reference 
associated with the mention of Max, so that “his parents” does not have to be interpreted 
via an anaphoric reference into “orphan”. Garnham and Oakhill (1988), like Postal, 
considered only the pronominal cases. In the experiments presented below we compared 
these cases directly with parallel cases using full NP anaphors. As in the original study, we 
use examples where there is word form identity between the verbal anaphoric island (“lies” 
in (2)) and the head noun of the corresponding NP, “the lies”, and cases where this identity 
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is broken, by switching to the past tense (“lied” vs. “lies”). In both cases, however, a 
morphological relationship exists between the two forms, which distinguishes them from 
the Haviland and Clark picnic supplies/beer examples. Our interest was in the comparison of 
the pronoun and the full NP cases, and the extent to which our results could be 
accommodated into Sanford and Garrod’s framework, augmented by the notion of 
centrality in a scenario. For the full NP anaphors, we predicted little or no effect on 
acceptability as a function of the type of antecedent, but possibly an effect on reading 
times, depending on how readily available an antecedent for “the lies” is made by use of a 
form of the verb “to lie”, and to what extent the morphological relationship aids the search 
for a referent. 
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 32 members of the staff and student populations 
of Sussex University, who had not previously taken part other similar experiments. They 
were paid for their participation. 
Materials. Thirty-two sets of experimental materials were constructed, and four 
passages were created from each set of materials.  Each passage began with an introductory 
sentence, which was presented in two separate displays, with the division indicated by the / 
in (6). 
(6)  In our village there is an artist called Marvin/who is quite well known. 
The passage then introduced, either directly or indirectly, a set of items of a particular kind 
(e.g., sketches) that would be referred to in the following sentence using an anaphoric noun 
phrase (e.g., “the sketches”) or a pronoun (e.g., “they”). When the items were introduced 
directly, a noun (e.g., “sketches”) was used, as in (7). 
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(7) Every Sunday he makes sketches by the river. 
In the versions in which the items were introduced indirectly, a cognate verb (e.g., 
“sketches”) was used, as in (7’). 
(7’) Every Sunday he sketches by the river. 
The last sentence included the anaphoric reference as in (8).  
(8) The sketches/They are admired by everyone. 
Each passage therefore comprised four parts, which were shown in separate displays 
to the participants. The participants’ task was to judge whether the final part of the passage, 
containing the repeated reference to the set of items, was a sensible continuation from the 
rest of the passage. The four passages derived from one set of materials are shown in Table 
1. 
---------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
----------------------- 
In addition to the 32 experimental items, 12 filler items were created in which the final part 
of the passage was not a sensible continuation from what had gone before. Participants 
were expected to answer “no” to these items. There were three items of the four types 
mentioned above, which were the same for all participants. An example is shown in (10). 
(10) Although the vineyard owner is a very busy man 
he still likes to help his staff with the bottling process 
He corks the wine with his own hands. 
The corks are all inserted by machine. 
Apparatus. The experiment was run on a PC fitted with an Advantech PCLabCard to 
provide millisecond-accurate timing, and a version of the TSCOP software (Norris, 1984). 
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The four parts of the passages were presented one at a time on the computer’s monitor, 
with each display starting 8 spaces from the left-hand side of the screen. In front of the 
screen, on a bench, were two response buttons, one labelled "YES" and the other "NO". 
Design. There were two main factors of interest. The first was whether the 
antecedent was provided explicitly by a noun or indirectly via a verb. The second was 
whether the anaphor was a full noun phrase or a pronoun. Both factors varied within 
subjects and within materials. Four lists of materials were produced, with 8 items in each of 
the four main experimental conditions. One passage from each material set occurred in 
each list, and across the experiment each item occurred in every condition. Equal numbers 
of participants saw each of the four lists. 
Procedure. The participants were tested individually in a small quiet laboratory. The 
order of the passages was randomised separately for each list. Participants were instructed 
to read the passages at their normal reading speed as though they were reading a book or a 
magazine. They were told not to spend too much time thinking about their answer to the 
question about whether the last display followed sensibly from the rest of the passage, but 
to base their answer on their first impressions. They were also told that there were no 
definitely right or wrong answers, but that we expected that most of the time they would 
think the answer was obviously “yes” or obviously “no”. 
The participants sat in front of the computer screen with the response buttons on 
the desk in front of them. At the beginning of each passage the prompt “NEXT ITEM” 
appeared on the screen. When it appeared, participants had to press the button on the side 
of their dominant hand to display the first part of the passage. Further presses displayed the 
other three parts of the passage. When the final part of the passage appeared it had a 
“*Y/N*” prompt at the end of the line as a reminder that a judgement was needed. 
Garnham et al.                                                                    Looking Back to “Anaphoric Islands”  9 
Participants had to press the appropriate button, “yes” or “no”, to indicate whether they 
thought it was a sensible continuation from the rest of the passage. The time between 
passages, during which the screen was blank, was 1 second. In case some people found that 
this time was too short, participants were instructed that they could pause for as long as 
they wished when the saw the words “NEXT ITEM”. All participants answered “yes” with 
their dominant hand and “no” with their other hand. They were not told whether or not 
their answers were correct. 
Before the experiment proper there were 6 practice trials to familiarize participants 
with the experimental procedure and with the kind of passages they would be reading. 
There was 1 passage in each of the four conditions defined by the factors of type of 
antecedent and type of anaphor, and two passages that were intended to elicit “no” 
responses.  
Results  
Times to make positive judgements. Out of a total of 1024 responses to 
experimental passages, 175 (17%) were negative.  In addition 28 data points (3%) were 
replaced because they lay more than 2.5 standard deviations above the participant’s mean. 
These data points were replaced by the cutoff value. The remaining times were subject to 
two analyses of variance, one in which participants was the random factor and one in which 
passages was the random factor. The mean times to make positive judgements are shown in 
Table 2. 
---------------------- 
Table 2 about here 
----------------------- 
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There was a significant main effect of type of antecedent (noun phrase vs. verb), F1(1, 31) = 
6.27, p = .017, Cohen’s d = .44; F2(1, 31) = 5.64, p = .024, Cohen’s d = .42. There was also an 
interaction between this factor and type of anaphor (noun phrase vs. pronoun), F1(1, 31) = 
5.11, p = .031, Cohen’s d =.57; F2(1, 31) = 4.47, p = .042, Cohen’s d = .54. The interaction of 
antecedent type and anaphor type was explored using post-hoc repeated measures t-tests 
(Bonferroni corrected). For the implicit (verb based) antecedent only, the noun anaphor 
(Mean = 2128ms) was significantly faster to resolve than the pronoun (Mean = 2464ms), 
t1(31) = 3.74, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .66, t2(31) = 3.16, p = .003, Cohen’s d = .56. In contrast for 
the explicit (noun) antedent the noun anaphor response time (Mean = 2136ms) did not 
differ from the pronoun anaphor (mean = 2066ms), t1(31) = 0.78, p = 0.44, t2(31) = 1.07, p = 
0.29. Judgements were faster following anaphors with noun phrase antecedents than 
following anaphors with verbal antecedents, though this effect was confined to pronominal 
anaphors. 
Number of Positive Judgements.  The percentage of positive judgements in the main 
experimental conditions is also shown in Table 2. Both main effects and their interaction 
were significant: Type of antecedent, F1(1, 31) = 24.22, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = .88; F2(1, 31) 
= 27.11, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = .94; Type of anaphor, F1(1, 31) = 22.80, p <.0001, Cohen’s d = 
.76; F2(1, 31) = 17.41, p <.0001, Cohen’s d = .68 ; Interaction, F1(1, 31) = 17.40, p <.0001, 
Cohen’s d = 1.05, F2(1, 31) = 23.60, p <.0001, Cohen’s d = 1.2. The interaction for 
antecedent type by anaphor was explored using post-hoc repeated measure t-tests 
(Bonferroni corrected). For the implicit (verb) antecedent only, the noun anaphor was 
significantly more accurately resolved (Mean =89.8%) than the pronoun (Mean = 63.3), 
t1(31) = 8.99, p < .001; t2(31) = 10.46, p < .001, both Cohen’s d > 1.5. In contrast, accuracy 
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for the explicit (noun) antedent the noun anaphor (Mean = 90.2%) did not differ from the 
pronoun anaphor (Mean = 88.3%), t1(31) = .64, p = .52; t2(31) = .75, p = .46  
 
There were fewer positive judgements for pronominal anaphors with verbal antecedents 
than for the other three conditions. 
Discussion 
In a direct comparison, we found that pronominal and full noun phrase anaphors 
behave differently with immediately preceding verbal antecedents. Noun phrase anaphors 
were not affected, either in the number of positive judgements or the time to make a 
positive judgement, when a nonstandard (implicit) verbal antecedent replaced the standard 
noun phrase antecedent. Pronouns were affected on both scores1. 
Experiment 1 used passages in the present tense, so that there was a superficial 
match between the implicit “verbal” antecedent (“lies” the verb) and the explicit nominal 
antecedent (“lies” the noun). Garnham and Oakhill (1988) showed that, at least in the case 
of pronominal antecedents, this superficial match increased the number of positive 
judgements that a pronoun was acceptable following an implicit verbal antecedent. It is 
possible that such superficial matching might have affected the results in the verbal 
conditions of Experiment 1, and in particular that it might have masked some difficulty in 
the case of the full noun phrase anaphors. We therefore repeated Experiment 1 with the 
passages in the past tense, so that the exact superficial match between the verb (e.g. “lied” 
in this second Experiment) and the cognate plural noun (“lies”) was broken. 
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Experiment 2 
Method 
Participants. The participants were 32 members of the staff and student populations 
of Sussex University, who had not taken part in Experiment 1 or any other similar 
experiment. They were paid for their participation. 
Materials. The materials were based on those used in Experiment 1. Each passage 
had all verbs changed from present to past tense. The four passages derived from one set of 
materials are shown in Table 3. 
---------------------- 
Table 3 about here 
----------------------- 
Apparatus. The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1. 
Design. The design was the same as that of Experiment 1. 
Procedure. The procedure was the same as in Experiment 1. 
Results 
Times to make positive judgements. Out of a total of 1024 responses to 
experimental passages, 149 (15%) were negative.  In addition 29 data points (3%) were 
replaced because they lay more than 2.5 standard deviations above the participant’s mean. 
These data points were replaced by the cutoff value. One participant answered “no” to 
every item in one condition, and this missing cell mean was replaced by the participants’ 
mean plus the condition mean minus the grand mean. The remaining times were subject to 
two analyses of variance, one in which participants was the random factor and one in which 
passages was the random factor. The mean times to make positive judgements are shown in 
Table 4. 
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---------------------- 
Table 4 about here 
----------------------- 
There was a main effect of type of antecedent (noun phrase vs. verb), F1(1, 31) = 19.81, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = .79; F2(1, 31) = 13.05, p < .005, Cohen’s d = .64. There was also an 
interaction between this factor and type of anaphor (noun phrase vs. pronoun), which just 
missed conventional levels of significance in the by-subjects analysis, F1(1, 31) = 3.98, p = 
.055, Cohen’s d = .51, F2(1, 31) = 6.17, p < .05, Cohen’s d = .63). As in Experiment 1, the 
interaction for antecedent type by anaphor was explored using post-hoc repeated measure 
t-tests (Bonferroni corrected). As in Experiment 1, judgements were faster following 
anaphors with noun phrase antecedents than following anaphors with verbal antecedents 
For the implicit (verb based) antecedent only, the noun anaphor was significantly faster to 
resolve (Mean = 1936ms) than the pronoun (Mean = 2186ms), t1(31) = 3.75, p <.001, 
Cohen’s d = 0.66, t2(31) = 5.24, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .93. In contrast, for the explicit (noun) 
antedent the noun anaphor (Mean = 1842ms) response time did not differ from the 
pronoun anaphor (Mean = 1826ms), t1(31) = 0.24, p=0.81, t2(31) = 0.27, p=0.79.  
 
Number of Positive Judgements.  The percentage of positive judgements in the main 
experimental conditions is also shown in Table 6. Both main effects and their interaction 
were significant: Type of antecedent, F1(1, 31) = 35.86, p <.0001, Cohen’s d = 1.07; F2(1, 31) 
= 53.73, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 1.3; Type of anaphor, F1(1, 31) = 40.67, p < .0001, Cohen’s d 
= 1.1; F2(1, 31) = 42.25, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 1.1; Interaction, F1(1, 31) = 38.76, p <.0001, 
Cohen’s d= 1.5; F2(1, 31) = 51.27, p < .0001, Cohen’s d = 1.8. The interaction of antecedent 
type by anaphor was again explored using repeated measures t-tests (Bonferroni corrected). 
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For the implicit (verb) antecedent only, the noun anaphor was significantly more accurately 
resolved (Mean = 94.0%) than the pronoun (Mean = 60.0%), t1(31) = 13.37, p < .001; t2(31) = 
15.4, p < .001, all Cohen’s d > 2.3. In contrast, in the accuracy data for the explicit (noun) 
antedent, the noun anaphor (Mean = 95.0%) did not differ from the pronoun anaphor 
(Mean = 93.0%), t1(31) = 0.78, p = 0.44; t2(31) = .90, p = .37. As in Experiment 1, there were 
fewer accurate judgements for pronominal anaphors with verbal antecedents than for the 
other three conditions. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 were similar to those of Experiment 12. Noun phrase 
anaphors were not affected, either in the number of positive judgements or the time to 
make a positive judgement, when a nonstandard (implicit) verbal antecedent replaced the 
standard noun phrase antecedent. Pronouns were affected on both counts. 
Experiment 2 broke the superficial match between the verbal and noun phrase 
antecedents, so it was not possible to explain the lack of effects for full noun phrase 
anaphors in Experiment 1  on the basis of a superficial match between the anaphor and the 
implicit verbal antecedent.  
General Discussion 
We investigated the processing of (attempted) anaphoric references into anaphoric 
islands, as described by Postal (1969). We compared anaphoric references using pronouns, 
as we had previously studied in Garnham and Oakhill (1988), with references back to the 
same object using full definite noun phrase anaphors. For the case of pronoun anaphors we 
found, as in Garnham and Oakhill (1988), that understanding references into anaphoric 
islands (“Little Billy lies…..they (= the lies)…”) were slowed by about 400ms compared with 
parallel references with NP antecedent (“Little Billy tells lies…..they (= the lies)…”). The same 
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slowing was found when the exact parallelism between “lies”(V) and “lies”(N) was broken 
by switching to the past tense. We did not replicate the substantial decrease in positive 
judgements about the acceptability of the sentences in the past tense (without exact 
parallelism) compared with the present tense found by Garnham and Oakhill (1988). For full 
noun phrase anaphors, reading times were approximately the same as for pronominal 
anaphors with NP antecedents, though the comparison is compromised by the length 
difference between the two types of anaphor. This result held for both verbal and NP 
antecedents. Similarly, acceptability judgements for NP anaphors were always high, even 
when the antecedent was verbal, and were similar to those for pronominal anaphors with 
NP antecedents. 
These results are readily explained within Sanford and Garrod’s theory of reference 
processing. For the pronoun anaphors, an NP antecedent places the relevant reference 
entity into explicit focus, which makes the anaphor both easy to process and perfectly 
acceptable. A verbal antecedent is most obviously thought of as placing the relevant 
reference entity into implicit focus (the extended domain of reference). It is hard to link a 
pronominal anaphor in such a case, and the sentence is relatively unacceptable because a 
pronoun should have an antecedent in explicit focus. The NP anaphors, however, are able to 
find antecedents in the extended domain of reference. They are acceptable even when the 
antecedent is verbal. In the examples that we used, sketches, for example, are a very likely 
component of a scenario in which an artist is described as sketching. A noun phrase anaphor 
can, therefore, pick up this antecedent with little processing difficulty. The morphological 
relation between “lies”, the plural noun, and “lies” or “lied”, the verb form, may aid this 
processing. 
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One unresolved issue is why a pronoun referring back into an anaphoric island incurs 
a processing penalty when pronouns in the centrality conditions in Cornish et al.'s (2005) 
experiments do not. For example in (11), it (= Mark’s beard) causes no more problem when 
(11b) in omitted than when it is included. 
(11a)  Have you noticed that Mark isn’t shaving. 
(11b) His straggly beard makes him look like a tramp. 
(11c) Yes, in fact he’s really allowing it to grow now. 
 
One possibility is that, although sketches appear to be central to the activity of 
sketching, the scenario in our sketching passage is actually about an artist living in a village, 
and sketches are not so central in that scenario. A beard (or at least the presence of facial 
hair), on the other hand, is central to a scenario in which a man is shaving. However, even if 
this idea is correct, we still need to explain why there is no time penalty for the noun phrase 
anaphor with a verbally introduced antecedent in these passages, even though there is such 
a penalty in the standard Haviland and Clark (1974) bridging inference cases. It may be, as 
suggested above, that lexical overlap (“lies”/”lies” or “lies”/”lied”) provides a crucial aid to 
mapping, but only in the extended domain of reference. 
Another possibility for explaining the difference between our results and those of 
Cornish et al. is that anaphoric islands are, indeed, a special case where a syntactic 
constraint (on grammaticality) applies, and that people are slowed down because they are 
reading an ungrammatical sentence. Further work is needed to decide between these 
possibilities. Such work should include the development of an independent measure of 
centrality, so that the effect of centrality can be properly assessed. 
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Footnote 
1It might be thought that the explicit (noun phrase) antecedent, noun phrase anaphor 
condition is contaminated by a “repeated name” penalty (Gordon, Grosz, & Gilliom, 1993). 
However, there was no evidence that such a penalty occurred. Despite the greater length of 
the crucial part of the sentence in the noun phrase anaphor condition, reading times were 
only 70 ms longer in that condition than in the pronominal anaphor, explicit antecedent 
condition (both Fs n.s.).  In Experiment 2 the corresponding reading time difference was 
only 16 ms (both Fs n.s.). 
2A combined analysis of the data from Experiments 1 and 2 provided no evidence, either in 
times or in judgements, for any difference in the pattern of the results between the two 
experiments (i.e. there were no interactions that included the experiment factor). 
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Table 1 
The four passages created from one of the sets of materials used in Experiment 1. 
Explicit antecedent, noun phrase anaphor 
In our village there is an artist called Marvin 
who is quite well known. 
Every Sunday he makes sketches by the river. 
The sketches are admired by everyone. 
Explicit antecedent, pronominal anaphor 
In our village there is an artist called Marvin 
who is quite well known. 
Every Sunday he makes sketches by the river. 
They are admired by everyone. 
Implicit antecedent, noun phrase anaphor 
In our village there is an artist called Marvin 
who is quite well known. 
Every Sunday he sketches by the river. 
The sketches are admired by everyone. 
Implicit antecedent, pronominal anaphor 
In our village there is an artist called Marvin 
who is quite well known. 
Every Sunday he sketches by the river. 
They are admired by everyone. 
 
 
Garnham et al.                                                                    Looking Back to “Anaphoric Islands”  22 
Table 2 
Mean times to read and make a judgement about the final display and proportions of “yes” 
judgements (in parentheses) in Experiment 1 
 Type of anaphor  
 Noun phrase Pronoun  
 
Antecedent 
Times Prop. 
“YES” 
Times Prop. 
“YES” 
Times Prop. 
“YES” 
Explicit (noun phrase) 2136 90.2 2066 88.3 2101 89.25  
Implicit (verb phrase) 2128 89.8 2464 63.3 2296 76.55 
       
 
 
Garnham et al.                                                                    Looking Back to “Anaphoric Islands”  23 
Table 3 
The four passages created from one of the sets of materials used in Experiment 2 
Explicit antecedent, noun phrase anaphor 
In our village there was an artist called Marvin 
who was quite well known. 
Every Sunday he made sketches by the river. 
The sketches were admired by everyone. 
Explicit antecedent, pronominal anaphor 
In our village there was an artist called Marvin 
who was quite well known. 
Every Sunday he made sketches by the river. 
They were admired by everyone. 
Implicit antecedent, noun phrase anaphor 
In our village there was an artist called Marvin 
who was quite well known. 
Every Sunday he sketched by the river. 
The sketches were admired by everyone. 
Implicit antecedent, pronominal anaphor 
In our village there was an artist called Marvin 
who was quite well known. 
Every Sunday he sketched by the river. 
They were admired by everyone. 
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Table 4 
Mean times to read and make a judgement about the final display and proportions of “yes” 
judgements (in parentheses) in Experiment 2 
 Type of anaphor  
 Noun phrase Pronoun  
 
Antecedent 
Times Prop. 
“YES” 
Times Prop. 
“YES 
Times Prop. 
“YES 
Explicit (noun phrase) 1842 95 1826 93 1834 94 
Implicit (verb phrase) 1936 94 2186 60 2061 77 
       
 
 
 
